Promoting voter registration: the effects of low-cost interventions on behaviour and norms by Kölle, Felix et al.
Promoting voter registration: the effects
of low-cost interventions on behaviour
and norms
FELIX KÖLLE
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Germany
TOM LANE
School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China
DANIELE NOSENZO
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Luxembourg and School of Economics, University
of Nottingham, UK
CHRIS STARMER*
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, UK
Abstract: We report two studies investigating whether, and if so how,
different low-cost interventions affect voter registration rates. Low-cost
message-based interventions are increasingly used to promote target
behaviours. While growing evidence shows that such ‘nudges’ often
signiﬁcantly impact behaviour, understanding of why interventions work or
fail in particular contexts remains underdeveloped. In a natural ﬁeld
experiment conducted before the 2015 UK general election, we varied
messages on a postcard sent by Oxford City Council to unregistered students
encouraging them to join the electoral register. Our primary ﬁnding from the
ﬁeld study is that just one of our interventions – a reminder that people
failing to register may be ﬁned – has a signiﬁcant positive impact. Offering
small monetary rewards to register instead has a negative but insigniﬁcant
effect. In a second study, using an online experiment we identify a particular
mechanism explaining the inﬂuence of this intervention. Speciﬁcally, we
show that our interventions have divergent effects on perceptions of the
normative appropriateness of registering: emphasising that failing to register
is punishable by law strengthened the perception that one ought to register,
while offering monetary inducements for registering weakened the perception
that doing so is an action already expected within society.
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Introduction
Behavioural science is increasingly informing the use of low-cost interven-
tions across a growing spectrum of public policy areas. The associated body
of research is being built by – and is of interest to – both academics (e.g., Chetty,
2015; Hallsworth et al., 2017) and applied policy units (e.g. Behavioural
Insights Team, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2016). Interventions often use subtle
forms of inﬂuence or persuasion based on general motivational mechanisms,
such as loss aversion, social information or social norms, and they are intended
to systematically nudge people’s behaviour towards some desired target at low
cost for the policy-maker.1 These interventions, often based on mailers with
carefully constructed messages, are used routinely to mobilize individuals by
both private and public organisations to, for example, promote workers’ prod-
uctivity in ﬁrms (Hossain & List, 2012), dissuade tax evasion (Hallsworth
et al., 2017), and encourage debt repayment (Bursztyn et al., 2017), among
other uses.
Our work is motivated by two stylised facts about these existing literatures.
First, while there is now considerable evidence that low-cost interventions can
sometimes have a signiﬁcant impact on particular target behaviours, it seems
that some types of intervention work well in some contexts and not others.
Second, as yet there is very limited understanding of the underlying mechan-
isms that determine when and where a low-cost intervention will or will not
work. In this paper, we examine the impact of different low-cost interventions
in a ﬁeld experiment and, via a follow-up online experiment, we test a potential
mechanism – related to social norm compliance – to help explain patterns in the
ﬁeld data. As such, we see ourselves as contributing to an agenda for examining
not only what works, but also what are the mechanisms that determine what
works.
We do this in the context of a particular policy area: voter registration.
In many countries – including the UK, where our study is conducted – any
citizen wishing to vote must ﬁrst register on the electoral roll. Registration in
the UK is technically mandatory, and non-registration is punishable with an
£80 ﬁne. Yet, in the past two decades a substantial gap has emerged between
1While the interventions we employ might be called ‘nudges’ by some, we do not use this termin-
ology because a subset of our interventions may work, in part, via perceived impacts on ﬁnancial
incentives and so may be considered distinct from ‘nudges’ under some accepted deﬁnitions, including
that of Thaler and Sunstein (2008). However, in the spirit of nudging, our interventions are low-cost
(at least to the policy-maker – they may have ‘emotional costs’ for their recipients), easy to implement
and, even when they involve a ﬁnancial incentive element (as we will show), they work, at least in part,
through psychological mechanisms that transcend the purely ﬁnancial aspects.
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the numbers of eligible and registered voters,2 and it widened following the
implementation of a legislative change in 2014: previously, all members of a
household could be registered collectively, but the law now requires each
person to register individually (Electoral Registration and Administration
Act 2013). Besides any intrinsic beneﬁts of wide democratic participation,
high registration rates serve governmental interests insofar as the electoral
roll has secondary uses such as fraud detection and jury recruitment.
Employing low-cost behavioural interventions – if this can be shown to be
effective – would be an attractive strategy in pursuit of this goal.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we explore interventions that can be applied, at
minimal ﬁnancial expense, to encourage citizens to register to vote in elections.
Speciﬁcally, we report the results of a ﬁeld experiment run ahead of the 2015
UK general election in partnership with one such interested party, Oxford City
Council (OCC), who sent postcards to students living in university accommo-
dation encouraging them to register. Councils have a particular interest in dis-
covering successful ways of targeting such students, as they represent a segment
of society whose registration rates have been particularly affected by the recent
legal change – previously, universities could register en masse all accommo-
dated students, but the new law required them to register individually. While
all of the postcards urged recipients not to miss their chance to vote, we system-
atically varied the precise content of their messages in order to test the effects of
different persuasion strategies on registration rates.
Across six treatments, we implemented different types of interventions
ranging from pure text/SMS-based reminders to register, to interventions
including small ﬁnancial incentives for registering. In a baseline treatment,
the postcard that was sent to unregistered student voters simply encouraged
them to register, without any additional message.
In three additional treatments, we explore the effectiveness of using small
ﬁnancial incentives for registering. In one treatment, we investigated the effect-
iveness of a threat of incurring a small monetary loss by adding a message high-
lighting the existence of the potential £80 ﬁne for those who fail to register.
Note, however, that subjects in all treatments were aware of the potential
ﬁne because this information had been sent to all subjects by the Council
prior to our intervention. As such, we believe that this treatment is best under-
stood as a reminder of the ﬁne, although it is conceivable that our postcard
raised the subjective probability that individuals assigned to being ﬁned. In
2 See, for example, the 2016 report, Getting the ‘Missing Millions’ on to the Electoral Register:
A Vision for Voter Registration Reform in the UK of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic
Participation, available at: https://drive.google.com/ﬁle/d/0B8L8l8Sw8aKVRHJPQ19EQVZiTTQ/view
(accessed May 2019).
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two further treatments, we tested the effectiveness of monetary rewards. In
these treatments, students who registered early were offered entry into a
lottery to win small cash prizes (of £80).
The use of monetary ﬁnes and rewards is an effective and widely applied
practice in many areas of public policy. For example, emphasising the possibil-
ity of facing costly legal action has been found to exert a substantial positive
effect in other policy domains, such as the enforcement of TV license registra-
tion (Fellner et al., 2013), debt repayment (Bursztyn et al., 2017), trafﬁc viola-
tions (Lu et al., 2016) and tax returns (Kleven et al., 2011), although the
evidence on the latter is rather mixed (for recent reviews of ﬁeld experiments
on tax compliance interventions, see Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al.,
2001; Hallsworth, 2014). Financial inducements, on the other hand, have
been found to raise voter registration (John et al., 2015) and voter turnout
(Panagopoulos, 2013), although in the latter case only when the inducements
were sufﬁciently large (in John et al., 2015, a lottery involved large ﬁnancial
incentives – between £1000 and £5000 – and produced only a two percentage
point increase in registration rates).3
Finally, we designed two additional treatments that did not involve any
ﬁnancial incentives but relied on purely psychological mechanisms to inﬂuence
behaviour. In one treatment, we studied the role of reminders in encouraging
registrations. Reminders have already been shown to be effective interventions
in relation to voter registration (Bennion & Nickerson, 2011), as well as in
other contexts (e.g., Altmann & Traxler, 2014). Thus, in this treatment, we
asked students to provide their phone number so that they could be sent a
reminder to register. In the other treatment, we wanted to test whether the likeli-
hood to register increases if one has previously stated the intention to register. In
this treatment, we asked students to report by text whether they intended to regis-
ter. Similar interventions have been used in the context of voter turnout: asking
subjects whether they intended to vote was found to have a positive impact on
turnout by Greenwald et al. (1987, 1988), but not by Smith et al. (2003).
Our results show that emphasising the possibility of being ﬁned yielded a
large positive effect, with subjects exposed to this intervention having 1.6
times higher odds of registering than those in the baseline condition. In con-
trast, the prospect of ﬁnancial gain had a negative but insigniﬁcant effect on
registration. The two treatments based on purely psychological mechanisms
had no measurable impact relative to the baseline.
3More generally, there is now a large and diverse literature in economics showing that the threat
of monetary loss may produce relatively strong responses, while the promise of monetary rewards
may produce relatively weak ones (e.g., for reviews of this literature, see Balliet et al., 2011; van
Lange et al., 2014; Nosenzo, 2016).
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In a follow-up online experiment using a different subject pool of UK stu-
dents, we investigated a possible mechanism underlying the effectiveness of the
ﬁne reminder and the ineffectiveness of the lottery treatments: that is, their
potentially contrasting effects on the perception of what constitutes socially
appropriate behaviour in the context of voter registration. A growing body
of recent economic research (e.g., Burks & Krupka, 2012; Gächter et al.,
2013; Krupka & Weber, 2013; Banerjee, 2016; Gächter et al., 2017; Krupka
et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018) suggests that compliance with social norms
drives behaviour across a wide range of contexts. Similarly, in the context of
policy interventions aimed at reinforcing civic duties, as in the case of voter
registration, interventions featuring small ﬁnancial gains and losses may
produce effects beyond those associated with the concrete monetary incentives,
because of the way they interact with the very notion of ‘civic duty’. In particu-
lar, we hypothesised that the ﬁne and lottery treatments may have divergent
effects on perceptions of the normative appropriateness of registering to
vote: while highlighting the threat of a ﬁnancial loss when failing to register
may reinforce the perception that registering to vote is what one ought to do,
offering potential ﬁnancial gains may weaken the perception that registering is
the socially appropriate thing to do.
Our results support these hypotheses. Using the incentivised norm-elicitation
method of Krupka and Weber (2013), we found that exposing individuals to
the ﬁne intervention strengthened their perception that failing to register was
socially inappropriate behaviour, while exposing them to the lottery interven-
tion weakened the perception that registering was socially appropriate behav-
iour. Consequently, we propose that a change in the strength of the social norm
relating to registration is a plausible putative mechanism that may partly
explain why the ﬁne intervention was successful while the lottery intervention
was not. Indeed, a possible interpretation of our results is that – just as in some
previous research (e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely et al., 2009;
Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012) – monetary incentives
crowded out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in socially constructive
behaviour, and the adverse effect of the lottery intervention on the perceived
social norm of registering may be partly behind this effect. Yet, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that tests for the effects of monetary incen-
tives on the perceived social appropriateness of certain actions directly.
Our study contributes to the literature regarding behavioural insights and
low-cost interventions in public policy, as well as that demonstrating the
importance of social norms for understanding human social behaviour. With
regard to the case of voter registration, previous studies in economics and pol-
itical science have analysed the effectiveness of different strategies to increase
registration rates. For example, Nickerson (2007) and Bennion and
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Nickerson (2011) studied the effectiveness of sending emails to unregistered
voters and found little evidence that this intervention could increase registra-
tion rates. On the other hand, face-to-face canvassing campaigns have been
shown to have positive effects on voter registration (Nickerson, 2015;
Braconnier et al., 2017). Relatedly, numerous studies have tested the efﬁcacy
of different persuasion strategies in promoting voter turnout. For example,
more personalised get-out-the-vote contact (e.g., Gerber & Green, 2000;
Green et al., 2003), priming one’s identity as a voter (Bryan et al., 2011) or
applying social pressure on people to vote (e.g., Gerber et al., 2008, 2010;
Davenport et al., 2010) all have positive effects on turnout (for a review of
this literature, see Rogers et al., 2013).
We distinguish ourselves from these previous studies in several ways. First,
while most previous studies employed purely non-monetary persuasion strat-
egies, our study uses a uniﬁed experimental framework to assess the effective-
ness of interventions involving positive and negative monetary incentives and
benchmarks their effects against other strategies involving no ﬁnancial incen-
tives. Another novel and distinctive feature of our contribution is the combin-
ation of online and ﬁeld experimental approaches, using the former to probe
the underlying mechanisms that make speciﬁc ﬁeld interventions more (or
less) successful. By virtue of this approach, we believe we are the ﬁrst to
show that policy interventions using positive incentives may weaken percep-
tions of the normative appropriateness of target behaviours, whereas those
relying on negative incentives may strengthen such perceptions. The insights
from our paper may have signiﬁcant policy implications that go beyond the
case of voter registration. In particular, our results suggest that low-cost inter-
ventions are particularly effective when they are successful at enhancing the
perceived social appropriateness of the targeted behaviour, while they might
backﬁre if they inadvertently reduce the perceived appropriateness of it.
Study I: ﬁeld experiment on voter registration
Experimental design
Our ﬁeld experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of a set of low-cost
interventions for raising voter registration rates ahead of the 2015 UK general
election. The full design involved a set of six interventions including a baseline,
two treatments involving small positive monetary incentives, one treatment
reminding subjects of the possibility of being ﬁned and two treatments involv-
ing non-monetary interventions. The interventions were implemented via
adjustments to a message sent in a bulk, randomised mail-out (details below)
to more than 7000 students living in the UK city of Oxford.
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We implemented one intervention reminding subjects of the threat of a mon-
etary loss for failing to register. We did this by highlighting to subjects the
truthful fact that they could be ﬁned £80 if they did not register. This
penalty is speciﬁed in UK law and, although in practice it is rarely enforced,
it is referred to in standard materials that OCC use to promote voter registra-
tion. Note, however, that subjects in all treatments had been made aware of the
potential ﬁne, by the Council, prior to our intervention. As such, while we do
not rule out the possibility that our postcard raised the subjective probability
that some individuals assigned to being ﬁned, our intervention can be best
seen as a reminder of the possibility of being ﬁned, rather than actually chang-
ing ﬁnancial incentives.
We implemented two interventions involving the prospect of monetary
rewards for registering. We did this with two treatments offering entry into a
lottery to win cash prizes of the value of £80 for those who registered by a
speciﬁc deadline.4 The two treatments differed only in that one attempted
also to harness regret aversion (Loomes & Sugden, 1982) by telling recipients
that those who did not register would still be entered into the lottery and
informed if they won, but would be unable to claim their prize. Regret aversion
has previously been shown to affect entry decisions into lotteries (Zeelenberg
& Pieters, 2004; Gneezy, 2014; Imas et al., 2017).
In the last two interventions, we attempted to employ purely non-monetary
persuasion strategies based on text messages. We did this in two treatments by
asking students to provide their phone number so that they could be sent a
reminder to register, or simply to report by text whether they intended to register.
Our interventions were transmitted via postcards, which OCC mailed to all
unregistered voters living in student accommodation belonging to the
University of Oxford and Oxford Brookes University on 9–10 March 2015,
ahead of the 20 April deadline for voters to register in the general election.
We collaborated with the Council to engineer the content of these postcards.
While all of the postcards encouraged their recipients to register, the content
of the messages they contained varied, allowing us to test the effects of the dif-
ferent persuasion strategies on registration rates.
All of the postcards were double sided (see Figure 1 for an image of the post-
card used in our Baseline condition and Supplementary Appendix A (available
online) for copies of the other postcards). The back simply contained the
4Note that, although the Fine and Lottery treatments both employ the value of £80 as the pos-
sible loss or gain, the subjective probabilities subjects perceived of these eventualities occurring may
have differed between the two treatments. This is not, therefore, an attempt to conduct a comparison
between the effects of monetarily equivalent positive and negative incentives; rather, we are interested
in comparing both against a baseline treatment featuring neither.
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message, “IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR RIGHT TO
VOTE, OVERLEAF.” The front featured the heading, “DON’T MISS
YOUR CHANCE TO VOTE! According to our records you have not yet regis-
tered to vote. It’s easy to register online. To go to the registration page simply
use one of the links below.” The bottom of this side contained the address of the
government webpage for registering to vote and a QR code that would take
recipients to the same page. These features were held constant across treat-
ments. The postcards differed by treatment only according to the text included
in a box below the heading on the front side.
Treatments
In the Baseline treatment, the box was left blank (Figure 1). This treatment
therefore serves as a basis for comparison against the other treatments.
In the Fine treatment, the box contained the message: “If you don’t register
you could be ﬁned £80.”
In the Lottery treatment, the box contained the message: “If you register by
27 March 2015 you will be entered into a lottery to receive one of ten £80
prizes. Winning students will be notiﬁed in June 2015.” In the Lottery Regret
treatment, the box contained the message: “You have been entered into a
lottery to receive one of ten £80 prizes. Winners will be notiﬁed in June
Figure 1. Postcard used in the Baseline treatment.
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2015 but you will only be able to claim your prize if you were already regis-
tered by 27 March 2015. If not your prize will go to another student.”
In the Reminder treatment, the box contained the message: “Would you like
us to send you a text reminder? If you do, please text ‘reminder’ to 60886.” In
the Intention treatment, the box contained the message: “We’d like to know if
you are intending to register? If you are, please text ‘myvote’ to 60886.” In
both cases, texts were free of charge and this was clearly stated in the postcard.
Assignment to treatment
These four postcards were sent out on 9–10 March 2015 to 7679 voters who
were still unregistered at the time and who lived in student accommodation
buildings belonging to the University of Oxford and Oxford Brookes
University. In order to minimise the likelihood of subjects seeing postcards
belonging to treatments other than the one they were assigned to, we randomised
assignment to treatment at the building level: all students living in a single build-
ing were assigned to the same treatment. For the University of Oxford, all stu-
dents living in a single college were assigned to the same treatment. For
Oxford Brookes University, all students living in a single hall of residence
were assigned to the same treatment, with the exception that two very large
halls were split into several geographically distinct units of assignment. This
was to ensure balance between treatments in the proportion of subjects attending
each university –we considered this important given the large demographic (par-
ticularly socioeconomic) differences between the student populations of each
university. We further balanced treatment assignment by residence size (small
and large) and age of college (ancient and modern) to account for other potential
unobserved characteristics.5 The resulting sample sizes were as follows: Baseline
(n = 1193); Fine (n = 1357); Lottery (n = 1250); Lottery Regret (n = 1317);
Reminder (n = 1300); and Intention (n = 1262). See Supplementary Appendix B
for further details on the assignment procedure and for a full breakdown of
the colleges and halls assigned to each treatment.
The dataset
OCC provided us with anonymised data on registration rates amongst students
residing in each college and hall at various points in time between January and
April 2015. In particular, for each individual, our dataset speciﬁes whether or
5 Despite our attempts to ensure balance in these dimensions, in Supplementary Appendix B, we
show that some imbalances arose between our treatments. In our analysis of treatment effects, we will
therefore include control variables to account for differences at the treatment level in university and
hall/college characteristics.
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not they were registered on 2 January, 8March (the day before the postcards of
our experiment were sent out) and any subsequent day between 9 March and
20 April (the formal deadline to register to vote for the general election). The
data also identify the treatment each individual was assigned to, their univer-
sity afﬁliation (University of Oxford or Oxford Brookes University) and their
hall or college. Other demographic data such as gender, age, etc., were not
available to the Council.
Results
Figure 2 shows how registration rates differ between treatments over the entire
period between the intervention and the formal deadline for registering. On a
daily basis between 8 March and 20 April, Figure 2 displays the cumulative
fraction, by treatment, of registered subjects amongst those who were unregis-
tered on 2 January.
Pre-intervention registration rates (i.e. in the period 2 January–8March) are very
similar across all treatments; the fraction of registered subjects ranges between
0.076 and 0.093, showing no signiﬁcant differences across treatments (see
Table 1). This suggests that later treatment differences are unlikely to be driven
by pre-existing differences between the subjects assigned to each intervention.
After our intervention (i.e., in the period 9 March–20 April), substantial dif-
ferences emerge in the registration rates across treatments. On 20 April (the day
of the registration deadline), the fraction of registered students amounts to 0.25
in Baseline, 0.31 in Fine, 0.21 in both Lottery treatments and 0.27 and 0.23 in
the Reminder and the Intention treatments, respectively. Hence, compared to
the case of a simple postcard, only the emphasis of (potential) negative monet-
ary consequences had a positive effect on registration; registration rates in Fine
are 24% higher than in Baseline. The introduction of (potential) positive mon-
etary consequences, in contrast, had no positive effect on registration rates.
While registration rates are initially similar to the ones in Baseline, they
become lower towards the end of our observation period. Overall, the registra-
tion rate in our Lottery treatments is 16% lower than in Baseline. While based
on the raw data the Reminder treatment seems to have a small positive effect on
registration rates, our analysis below shows that this effect becomes negligible
once controlling for demographic characteristics.
To further explore the observed treatment differences in registration rates, we
run logistic regressions to model the individual-level registration decision.6 Our
6 Very similar results are obtained when using linear probability models instead of logistic
regressions.
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dependent variable is 1 or 0 depending onwhether or not an individual has regis-
tered in a given period. As independent variables, we use dummies to represent
the treatment to which an individual was assigned. To test the robustness of our
results, in some of the models we include additional control variables. In particu-
lar, given the very different natures of the two universities that were included in
our study, we also include a dummy variable for whether a student was afﬁliated
with either Oxford Brookes University or University of Oxford. As further con-
trols, we include: which of the two Oxford voting areas (general election con-
stituencies) a given student resides in; the size of the residence unit they live in;
and a ‘modern’ dummy, which takes value 0 if the college or hall in which
they live is older than 100 years and value 1 otherwise.7 To correct for hetero-
scedasticity and potential dependency of observations within halls, we cluster
standard errors by residence unit, which is the level of randomisation.8 The
results of these regressions are reported in Table 1.
Figure 2. Cumulative registration rates by treatment.
Notes: Figure 2 shows, on a daily basis between 8 March and 20 April, the amount of
registered students in the treated buildings as a fraction of all students in these buildings
who had been unregistered on 2 January. The vertical dashed line at day 0 represents the
day of our treatment intervention (9 March).
7We included this dummy because we conjectured that there could be some difference in ethos or
culture that could be relevant to the registration decision when comparing older and more newly
established colleges.
8 That is, each college, hall, residence block and/or cross-college accommodation is treated as pro-
viding a cluster of observations, leading to a total of 82 clusters (see Supplementary Appendix B for
further details).
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Model (1) reports, for each treatment relative to Baseline (the omitted category),
the factor changes in the odds of registering in the period before our intervention
(i.e., between 2 January and 8March). The sample includes all students in treated
buildings who were unregistered on 2 January. In the Baseline treatment, the
odds of registering in the pre-intervention period are 0.096 (i.e., there are expected
to be approximately 10 unregistered students for each registered student in our
benchmark condition). The odds of registering are very similar in the other treat-
ments: in all cases, the factor changes in the odds are close to 1 and none of the
treatment variables are signiﬁcant (all p-values > 0.686). Very similar results are
obtained in model (2), where we include the additional control variables. While
the magnitudes of the factor changes in odds of registering change slightly, all
Table 1. The effects of treatments on registration rates.
Dependent variable: registered (1 if yes, 0
otherwise)
Before intervention
(2 January–8 March)
After intervention
(9 March–20 April)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Fine 0.910 0.955 1.569** 1.738***
(0.242) (0.244) (0.332) (0.353)
Lottery 1.046 1.086 0.709 0.707
(0.252) (0.192) (0.241) (0.224)
Lottery Regret 0.969 1.170 0.719 0.795
(0.259) (0.265) (0.226) (0.204)
Intention 0.871 0.842 0.945 1.002
(0.299) (0.266) (0.203) (0.208)
Reminder 1.079 1.019 1.139 1.013
(0.256) (0.195) (0.281) (0.196)
Odds of registering in Baseline 0.096*** 0.118*** 0.217*** 0.240***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.042) (0.045)
Wald test (p-values)
Lottery = Lottery Regret 0.755 0.640 0.971 0.742
Reminder = Intention 0.508 0.522 0.285 0.956
Controls No Yes No Yes
n 8397 8397 7679 7679
Notes: Table 1 reports odds ratios from logistic regressions. A ratio greater than 1 implies a posi-
tive effect, whereas a ratio smaller than 1 implies a negative effect. The dependent variable indi-
cates whether an individual registered within a given period. Models (1) and (2) include all
subjects that were unregistered on 2 January. Models (3) and (4) include all subjects that partici-
pated in our experiment (i.e., who were not registered on 9 March, the day we sent out our post-
cards). Control variables include dummies for: student’s university (Oxford Brookes University or
University of Oxford); voting constituency; age of student hall (younger or older than 100 years);
and size of the residence unit. Robust standard errors with n = 82 clusters at the residence unit are
reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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treatment dummies remain insigniﬁcant. This conﬁrms that registration rates are
indistinguishable across treatments in the pre-intervention period.
In model (3), we look at the effect of our different interventions after their
implementation. The dependent variable now is whether an individual regis-
tered or not during the period between 9 March and 20 April, the day of the
registration deadline. The sample includes all students in treated buildings
who were still unregistered on 8 March (i.e., we drop those who registered
before the intervention, since they did not receive the postcards that were
sent out on 9 March). The treatment dummies therefore represent treatment
differences in registration rates after the intervention. The odds of registering
in Baseline are now 0.217. The higher baseline odds of registering in the
post-intervention period relative to the pre-intervention period may reﬂect an
impact of sending the postcard per se or a natural increasing trend in registra-
tions as the deadline for the general election draws nearer.9
The Fine treatment increases the Baseline odds by a factor of 1.6 and the effect
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This implies an expected ratio of more than 3:1
between unregistered and registered students in the Fine treatment (the odds
of registering are 0.217 × 1.569 = 0.340). In contrast, the Lottery and Lottery
Regret treatments reduce the odds of registering relative to Baseline by factors
of 0.709 and 0.719, respectively, although the effects are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant (p = 0.312 and p = 0.295, respectively). Furthermore, the two non-monetary
treatments, Intention and Reminder, had no discernible effect on registration
rates. The odds ratios are close to and not statistically different from 1 (both
p > 0.748). We believe that the reason for this result is that only 4 out of 1300
students requested a text reminder, and only 9 out of 1262 students texted
their intention to register. This implies that only a small number of subjects
were actually ‘treated’ by our interventions, and it is thus not very surprising
that these treatments had no measurable impact relative to the baseline.
Again, very similar results are obtained when including our control variables,
as is shown in model (4). In Supplementary Appendix C, we further show that
duration analysis, using a Cox proportional hazard model, yields qualitatively
similar results for these post-intervention treatment differences.
Study II: the effects of the interventions on social norms
Our ﬁeld experiment ﬁnds that highlighting the threat of a monetary ﬁne is
effective at encouraging registrations, while introducing the chance of a
9We cannot distinguish between these two explanations because, in designing our treatments in
collaboration with OCC, we agreed not to have a treatment where no postcard was sent.
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monetary gain is not. A number of possible mechanisms might contribute to an
explanation of this pattern. For example, the ﬁne reminder may have increased
the subjective probability of suffering ﬁnancial loss, and this, perhaps combined
with some element of loss aversion, might explain the particular impact of the
ﬁne treatment. While we do not rule out such mechanisms being at work in
our data, we explore a possible explanation that would potentially give rise to
opposing impacts of the Fine and Lottery treatments.10 Speciﬁcally, we investi-
gate the potentially different effects of these interventions on social norms (i.e.,
collectively recognised rules of behaviour that deﬁne which actions are viewed
as socially appropriate) (Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000).
We conjecture that the Fine treatment may strengthen a pre-existing social
norm that registering to vote is what one ought to do: emphasising that
failing to register is against the law may reinforce one’s perception that such
behaviour is socially inappropriate.11 In contrast, the Lottery treatments may
weaken that same social norm – the offer of money for registering may
suggest to recipients that registering is not something already unconditionally
demanded of them by society. If social norms inﬂuence registration behaviour,
such alterations of subjects’ perceptions of them could directly affect their deci-
sions over registration. Indeed, the failure of the Lottery treatments is reminis-
cent of previous research showing that the introduction of economic incentives
can crowd out people’s intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially. One of the
possible mechanisms behind the ineffectiveness of ﬁnancial rewards could be
that the lottery weakens the social norm of registering, offsetting any positive
effects of the monetary incentive.
Experimental design and procedures
To investigate this, we ran an online study, employing the social norm elicitation
task pioneered by Krupka and Weber (2013). In this study, we ﬁrst described to
subjects the setting of our ﬁeld experiment. We then exposed each subject to the
postcard used in one of three treatments – Baseline, Fine and Lottery12 – and in
10 Recall that while monetary losses have a signiﬁcant positive impact on registration rates (rela-
tive to baseline), there is some indication in our data that the impact of monetary gains may in fact be
negative, as registration is lower under the Lottery treatments than under Baseline (though this is not
signiﬁcant).
11 There is some debate over whether social norms and laws are substitutes or whether laws dir-
ectly shape norms; see, for instance, Posner (2009) and Benabou and Tirole (2011).
12We only focus on one version of the Lottery treatments because, in the ﬁeld experiment, the
Lottery Regret treatment was statistically indistinguishable from the Lottery treatment and the
Lottery treatment was easier to describe to subjects.
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each case measured the social norms they perceived pertaining to registration
behaviour.
This study was run in June 2016, with subjects who were students at the
University of Nottingham, recruited through the Online Recruitment System
for Economic Experiments (ORSEE; Greiner, 2015), an online database of
experimental participants. Thus, the subjects would have been demographic-
ally similar to those in the ﬁeld experiment, but would not have been previously
exposed to the postcards.13 In total n = 189 subjects participated in the study:
65 were shown the Baseline postcard, 61 the Fine postcard, and 63 the Lottery
postcard. The study was conducted using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2016), an
online survey platform.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were told: “Imagine that the
date is March 8, 2015. There is an upcoming General Election on May 7,
and a local council wants to encourage people to register to vote before the
deadline on April 20.” They were further informed that the council is consider-
ing strategies to raise registration amongst students in university accommoda-
tion, where rates have been particularly low. They were then told that the
council decides to send a card to every unregistered student living in university
accommodation, and they were then presented with a picture of one of three
cards. These were replicas of the postcards sent out to students in the
Baseline, Fine and Lottery treatments (the only difference was that the cards
were cropped to cut off the OCC logo).
Subjects were then asked to evaluate “how socially appropriate most people
would think it would be for a student, having received this card, to register to
vote or not to register to vote.” Earlier in the instructions, we had deﬁned social
appropriateness as “behaviour that you think most people would agree is the
‘correct’ thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if
someone were to behave in a socially inappropriate way, then other people
might be angry at them.”14
13 It was not possible to recruit the same participants from Study I again for Study II because we
did not collect any personal information about the subjects who took part in Study I. For Study II, we
therefore recruited subjects from a similar population (undergraduate students at another British uni-
versity), and our inferences assume that norms are not too dissimilar between the populations used in
the two studies. We do not think that this assumption is very strong given that student samples are
fairly homogeneous, especially within a given country/culture (e.g., see Gächter, 2010). Another
advantage of using a between-subject design (with different samples for Study I and Study II) is
that we can circumvent the issue of order and spill-over effects that may arise in within-subject
designs (for a discussion of this point in relation to norm-elicitation experiments, see D’Adda
et al., 2016).
14 This follows the experimental instructions introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). See
Supplementary Appendix D for the experimental instructions and screenshots of the online survey.
Promoting voter registration 15
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.10
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Nottingham, on 05 Jun 2019 at 08:57:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
We then asked subjects to evaluate the social appropriateness of each
action (register to vote, not register to vote) on a four-point scale, encompass-
ing ‘very socially appropriate’, ‘somewhat socially appropriate’, ‘somewhat
socially inappropriate’ and ‘very socially inappropriate’.15 These evaluations
were incentivised such that subjects were encouraged to coordinate on the
social norm: we told subjects we would randomly select one of the two
actions, and for this action, they would be eligible to receive a cash prize if
their evaluation of its social appropriateness was the same as that chosen by
the most other subjects.16
Results
To analyse the data, we follow Krupka and Weber (2013) in transforming the
evaluations into numerical values. We assign evenly spaced values of −1 for the
rating ‘very socially inappropriate’, –0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially
inappropriate’, 0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially appropriate’ and 1 for
the rating ‘very socially appropriate’. We then calculate the mean ratings for
each action by subjects exposed to each treatment. The results are displayed
in Figure 3.
We ﬁnd that, regardless of the treatment subjects are exposed to, registering
to vote tends to be seen as highly appropriate behaviour, while failing to
register is generally seen as inappropriate. However, there are also subtle but
signiﬁcant treatment differences in people’s appropriateness judgements.
In particular, subjects exposed to the Lottery treatment perceived registering
to vote to be less appropriate than did those exposed to the Baseline treatment
(two-tailed Fisher randomisation test, p = 0.012).17 Moreover, failing to
15 Asking subjects to evaluate the appropriateness of all possible actions in the given scenario is
standard procedure in studies following the methodology of Krupka and Weber (2013). In cases like
ours, where there are only two possible actions (register to vote, not register to vote), the appropri-
ateness rating given to one action may not be the inverse of the rating given to the alternative
action. For instance, it is conceivable that participants could believe that both registering to vote
and not registering to vote were very socially appropriate. Thus, it is necessary to measure treatment
effects on the appropriateness of both actions.
16 As the study was very short and conducted online, we paid only one out of every eight subjects,
determined retrospectively at random (subjects knew about this at the beginning of the experiment).
Those chosen for payment received an automatic £10, plus a further £30 if their evaluation matched
that of the most other subjects in their treatment. Althoughmost subjects would not be paid, the study
was still incentivised to a conventional level: all subjects had a 1/8 chance of receiving between £10
and £40 for an approximately 5-minute task.
17 See Moir (1998) for a discussion of the randomisation test, and Kaiser and Lacy (2009) for
information on the Stata command to apply it. In Study II, we correct p-values for testing multiple
hypotheses for two interrelated dependent variables (the appropriateness of registering to vote and
not registering to vote). For each dependent variable, we test Lottery versus Baseline and Fine
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register to vote was perceived to be more inappropriate by subjects exposed
to the Fine treatment than it was by those exposed to the Baseline treatment
(p = 0.016). In contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the perceptions of
appropriateness of registering between Fine and Baseline (p = 0.543), or the
inappropriateness of not registering between Lottery and Baseline (p = 0.718).
Table 2 sheds light on how these treatment differences arise. It presents, for
each treatment, the distribution of subjects’ evaluations of the social appropri-
ateness of each action. It shows that the lower perceived social appropriateness
of registering under Lottery is driven by fewer subjects regarding registering as
‘very socially appropriate’ relative to Baseline (50.8% versus 78.1%). We also
see that the higher perceived social inappropriateness of failing to register in the
Figure 3. Social appropriateness of registration behaviour by treatment.
Notes: Figure 3 shows the mean appropriateness ratings assigned to each action (regis-
tering to vote, not registering to vote) by subjects exposed to the Baseline, Fine and
Lottery postcards. Mean ratings are taken by assigning values of –1, –0.33, 0.33 and
1 for the ratings ‘very inappropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’, ‘somewhat appropri-
ate’ and ‘very appropriate’, respectively, and averaging the values for each action for all
participants exposed to a given treatment. Error bars indicate standard errors of the
mean.
versus Baseline, a total of four tests. The correctionmethod is that of Benjamini andHochberg (1995),
and corrected p-values are displayed in the text.
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Table 2. Distribution of social appropriateness evaluations.
Appropriateness of registering to vote
Very socially inappropriate Somewhat socially inappropriate Somewhat socially appropriate Very socially appropriate
Baseline 1.6 0 20.3 78.1
Fine 0 1.7 31.7 66.7
Lottery 0 8.2 41.0 50.8
Appropriateness of not registering to vote
Very socially inappropriate Somewhat socially inappropriate Somewhat socially appropriate Very socially appropriate
Baseline 10.9 54.7 28.1 6.3
Fine 25.0 58.3 13.3 3.3
Lottery 9.8 60.7 23.0 6.6
Notes: Table 2 displays, for each treatment, the distribution of social appropriateness evaluations. The numbers are the percentages of subjects who eval-
uated registering to vote (top panel) or not registering to vote (bottom panel) as very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat
socially appropriate or very socially appropriate.
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Fine treatment is driven by more subjects regarding not registering as ‘very
socially inappropriate’ relative to Baseline (25.0% versus 10.9%) and by
fewer regarding it as ‘somewhat socially appropriate’ (13.3% versus 28.1%).
To summarise the results of Study II, we ﬁnd that in all treatments subjects
perceived that there exists a social norm of registering to vote. Subjects exposed
to the Fine treatment perceived a relatively stronger stigma for violating this
norm: failing to register is seen as particularly inappropriate when the norm
is supported by penalties against violators. By contrast, subjects exposed to
the Lottery treatment perceived a weaker normative injunction to follow the
norm. We ﬁnd this effect intuitive: offering monetary rewards for taking
behaviours that are already demanded by the norm sends mixed signals
about the strength of the normative prescription. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
each type of incentive only affects the perception of the appropriateness of
the behaviour that is explicitly targeted by the incentive: penalties against vio-
lators inﬂuence the inappropriateness of violations, while rewards for compli-
ant individuals inﬂuence the appropriateness of compliance.
Overall, our results suggest that emphasising the ﬁne for failing to register
strengthens the social norm against such behaviour, while offering monetary
incentives for successfully registering weakens the social norm demanding
such behaviour. Given the strong evidence from previous studies (see
‘Introduction’ section) that social norms inﬂuence economic behaviour, we
propose that these normative effects explain at least part of the success of
the Fine treatment and the ineffectiveness of the Lottery treatments.
Conclusion
Low-cost interventions are increasingly being used to promote a wide range
of behaviours targeted by different messages. While a growing body of evi-
dence shows that such interventions often signiﬁcantly impact behaviour,
understanding of why they work or fail in particular contexts remains under-
developed. In this paper, we investigated whether – and if so why – different
low-cost interventions affect voter registration rates. A unique feature of our
study is that it combines two types of experiment: a ﬁeld experiment to
measure which persuasion strategy is most effective in raising registrations;
and an online experiment to investigate possible reasons why different strat-
egies may trigger different behavioural responses.
Our ﬁeld experiment shows that highlighting to citizens the possibility of
being ﬁned for failing to register is an effective strategy for public bodies to
use. The effect we identiﬁed was not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also of
a substantial magnitude: having the ﬁne emphasised raised the odds of register-
ing by a factor of 1.6, from 0.22 in the Baseline condition to 0.34.
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In contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence that offering small ﬁnancial inducements for
registration is an effective strategy. We speculate that the lack of success of our
Lottery treatments may represent another case of economic incentives crowd-
ing out people’s intrinsic motivation to behave in socially constructive ways
(e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ariely et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011;
Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). We note that, in this respect, our study’s
results differ from those of John et al. (2015), who also offered entry into a
cash lottery as a reward for registering to vote in the UK. They found a
small (approximately 2%) but signiﬁcant positive effect of monetary rewards
on registration rates. A possible explanation for the contrast in results is that
the maximum winnings offered by John et al. (2015) were much larger than
ours (between £1000 and £5000). Their large material incentives may well
have been enough to produce a positive effect, even if they had to overcome
a crowding out effect (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). A tentative conclusion
could then be that, when offering cash for behaviours where there is a danger
of crowding out intrinsic motivations, one must ‘pay enough or don’t pay
at all’ (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a). This would also be consistent with
Panagopoulos (2013), who found that ﬁnancial inducements raised voter
turnout, but only once they were sufﬁciently large.
Our online experiment suggests a possible explanation for the contrasting
effects of highlighting negative monetary incentives and introducing positive
monetary incentives on voter registration rates: that is, because of their differ-
ential effects on relevant social norms. In fact, we believe our study is the ﬁrst to
directly measure the effects of ﬁnancial incentives on the social appropriateness
of any type of behaviour. Our results show that emphasising the ﬁne strength-
ens the perception that failing to register is socially inappropriate, while offer-
ing money for registering weakens the perception that registering is socially
appropriate – and we conjecture that this weakening could be behind a crowd-
ing out of intrinsic motivations. Note that the effectiveness of our ﬁne treat-
ment contrasts with the results of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b), who
found that parents were more likely to be late in picking up their children
when their day-care centres threatened to ﬁne them for doing so, plausibly
because the ﬁne weakened the social norm that parents should turn up on
time. Why in our case highlighting the ﬁne instead is found to strengthen the
social norm of registering may be because it is administered by a public body
and based on existing law.
Taken together, we interpret our results as evidence that social norms may be
one determinant of voter registration. This would be consistent with other
recent experimental literature pointing to the importance of social norms as
drivers of a wide range of behaviours (e.g., Burks & Krupka, 2012; Gachter
et al., 2013; Krupka & Weber, 2013; Banerjee, 2016; Kimbrough &
20 F E L I X K Ö L L E E T A L .
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.10
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Nottingham, on 05 Jun 2019 at 08:57:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018). A key novel con-
tribution of our study in relation to this literature is in identifying the poten-
tially important role of social norms in determining the effectiveness of
different types of low-cost interventions. As such, we believe that the insights
from our paper have important policy implications that go beyond the case
of voter registration. In particular, our results suggest that low-cost interven-
tions are particularly successful in nudging individuals towards a target behav-
iour when they strengthen the social norms that underlie that target. In
contrast, interventions might backﬁre when they weaken the social norms
that sustain the target behaviour.
These ﬁndings highlight the importance for policy-makers to anticipate the
potential interactions between particular interventions designed to target
speciﬁc behaviours and the social norms that regulate those same behaviours.
While it may be difﬁcult to surmise, ex ante, whether a particular intervention
may strengthen or weaken a social norm, one of the contributions of our study
is to show that there are simple tools, such as our norm-elicitation experiment,
that are available to researchers and policy-makers alike and that can be used
to measure the impact of policy interventions on underlying social norms
before a particular behavioural intervention is rolled out in the ﬁeld.
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